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I n the study of public policy, one rarely finds a clear, causal relationship between policy intent and subsequent outcomes. Beyond the difficulty of neatly identifying causal relationships in a complex society, there exists the problem that public policymakers are from time to time given to hyperbole. This tendency tends to widen the already substantial gap between claimed and potential benefits. Thus it is unusual that the aftermath of a major policy change turns out exactly as predicted.
We have discovered what we believe to be an instance of such a unique occurrence. In 1981, the federal government proclaimed that it would henceforth cease direct federal investment in the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The stated rationale for this policy shift was that ample private capital was available to support continued investment in the growth of HMOs nationwide. 1 Cynical observers both within and outside the HMO movement snidely suggested that the real agenda was for the government to find any plausible excuse it could to cut spending, and that the administration would neither be surprised nor care if the HMO industry went swiftly down the tubes. Little did those predicting a premature death for the HMO industry as a result of this policy change know that they would be proven wrong, in dramatic fashion.
At this writing, it is fair to say that health maintenance organizations, nationwide, are awash in private capital. While the traditional, not-forprofit health plans like Kaiser, Group Health of Puget Sound, and Health Insurance Plan of New York continue to enjoy reasonable growth, the growth of privately financed plans has been phenomenal. In June 1981, only 18 percent of all HMOs were for-profit. By June 1985, this share had climbed to 36 percent, reflecting approximately 100 more for-profit plans. 2 While many of these plans started up between 1981 and 1985 an estimated one-quarter to one-third of the additional for-profit plans represent plan conversions from nonprofit to for-profit status. In terms of HMO membership by profit status, 1985 showed a for-profit membership of 26 percent of total HMO membership, compared to the forprofit's share of only 12 percent in 1981. 3 This represents a gain of about 3.7 million members in for-profit plans, or 43 percent of a total increase of 8.6 million members, In a significant sense, the trends observed above understate the influence of private capital in the HMO field. For one thing, most not-forprofit plans' debt is placed with private investors. For another, many not-for-profit plans engage the services of for-profit management companies. Yet the trend toward direct ownership of HMOs by private equity investors highlighted above represents a substantial departure from the historical development of the industry.
Given the demographics involved, this startling shift in course is unlikely to be transitory. Despite gains in recent years, HMOs currently HMOS AND FINANCE 53 enroll only 19 million, or 8 percent of the U.S. population, Noting the experience in such markets as Minneapolis-St.Paul suggesting that a 30 percent HMO market share is not implausible in many areas, there appears to be no practical limit to the growth of the privately financed HMO industry in the near future.
This perception has not been lost on the nation's investment community. Over the last three years, the stock market has been crazy for HMOs. Even after recent "corrections" (that is, precipitous drops) in the stock prices of many publicly traded HMO operating companies, prices willingly paid to ride the HMO rocket are as stratospheric as HMO enrollment growth rates.
If the nation's capital markets simply traded paper in a vacuum, this state of affairs would be only of passing interest to students of health policy. The public debt and equity markets, however, are in fact key determiners of the capital pricing information that channels the flow of private resources in and out of industries and individual businesses. As the nation's health care delivery system becomes increasingly reliant on private capital financing sources, changing investor perceptions about the health care industry in general-and the HMO industry in particularwill play an increasingly important role in the decisions of health care managers and policymakers.
Given the embryonic state of both investor involvement in alternative delivery systems and data on developments in these markets, it is probably impossible at this juncture to draw any definitive conclusions about where all this is going. Yet we believe that it is possible to discern some trends in the data available to date that are strongly suggestive of future developments.
The State Of HMO Eauitv Markets In Late 1985
As Exhibit 1 indicates, while prices for many HMO operating company stocks have pulled back from their remarkable early high levels, at least six stocks still trade well above current levels in the general market when evaluated on the basis of price/ earnings multiples for reported earnings. Readers familiar with price/ earnings (P/ E) ratios in the stock market generally will note a certain aura of optimism in recent prices (let alone historic peak prices); even with the Dow Jones Industrial average pushing through the 1,500 level, the thirty Dow industrial stocks trade at an average P/ E of sixteen. Surely, the market expects great things from these HMO companies, for a stock trading at a P/ E multiple of 38, such as U.S. Health Care Systems, is annually earning only 2.63 percent of its stock price. At a time when the Federal Deposit Insurance Company insured savings accounts are earning 5-7 percent, such prices clearly imply that the market expects these companies to earn, in the future, that which they are not earning at present. The IPO phenomenon. A partial explanation of the present pricing structure lies in the workings of the market for newly public stocks, made available through initial public offerings (IPOs). For reasons that can only be adduced empirically, the combination of a generally rising market, a hot new industry, and a spate of new public offerings can produce a volcanic response in the nation's capital markets. When Genentech, a biotechnology firm involved in recombinant DNA research, went public early in the decade, its stock price more than tripled in the first day of trading. During the high-tech market craze of 1982-83 (before the hightech market crash of 1983-84), any new stock with the suffix "-onics" in the name of the firm automatically commanded at least thirty times earnings (if there were any earnings).
One hypothesis long advanced to explain this phenomenon is the Theory of the Greater Fool. This theory holds that each fool willing to shell out thirty times earnings for a company no one has ever heard of must believe that there exists a Greater Fool who will shell out forty times earnings for the same security. Given after-market trading in some initial public offerings, this theory cannot be dismissed out of hand, as the hypothesized instinct of the first fool often proves to be correct.
An alternative hypothesis might be termed the Theory of Perpetual Earnings Growth. This derives from the fact that, at any given time, security prices reflect both known facts and expectations about the future. Hence, built into the price of each stock is a discount for expected earnings performance. One relevant datum on American investor psychology is that the retirement homes of America are filled with citizens who are still kicking themselves for not having purchased IBM stock in 1946. In an era when a college drop-out working in his garage can produce a $2 billion computer company by the age of twenty-seven, stock in a newly public company isn't just an equity security-it's a lottery ticket. While the probability of cashing in is low, the return, having done so, can be formidable.
Thus, the market for what the folks at First Jersey Securities call "emerging growth companies" is really comprised of investors willing to speculate on the possibility of continuous, dramatic growth in sales and earnings. As the bidding for each hot new stock mounts, however, it happens from time to time that the prices paid for initial public offering stocks transcend levels consistent with five-year and ten-year growth projections, and rise toward levels justified only by an assumption of 40 percent annual earnings growth between now and the Second Coming. In the trade, this phenomenon is known as "discounting the hereafter."
HMO Finances-Now And The Future
To examine the applicability of this hypothesis to the current market for equity in HMOs, it is helpful to examine an illustration independent of the unique circumstances of individual plans, and the individual firms that own them. While the reported earnings of publicly traded companies are important determiners of stock prices, they are somewhat less relevant in examining intrinsic values of firms. Earnings reports are often shaded by accounting treatments designed to minimize reported earnings for tax purposes or maximize earnings for stockholder relations purposes. Thus, in evaluating future values, particularly in such situations as mergers and acquisitions, analysis is more commonly based on discounted cash flow analysis. 4 The flows of cash, in and out of an operation in the future, are netted together to produce annual (or in some cases, quarterly) estimates of flows. These flows are then discounted back to the present, using a discount rate appropriate to the type of investment to produce an estimate of the "net present value" of the future flow of cash.
To examine the underpinnings of current market pricing, we performed such an analysis of eight publicly traded HMO operating companies' operations during calendar year. 1984. 5 We found that annual cash flows per enrollee in these companies ranged from $35 to $103, and that cash flows as a percentage of revenues ranged from 4.21 percent to 12.53 percent. For purposes of this analysis, therefore, we selected medians of both these values, and constructed a number of scenarios around them.
To construct an appropriately optimistic scenario, we first assumed that enrollment growth would continue at the average 1981-84 annual rate (17.5 percent) experienced by HMOs nationwide continuously for the next ten years. We further assumed that there would be no compression of cash flow margins for for-profit plans during the period, and that cash flows from operations would remain at 8.32 percent of revenues, the median value identified above. To further provide a cast of optimism, we assumed that whatever new investments were needed to finance this enrollment growth would not have a net effect on overall cash flows; in effect, that both new investment and repayment of principal on old debt could be accomplished without either compressing operating margins or causing equity dilution through the issuance of new stock.
Our second scenario was somewhat less optimistic. We continued to assume 17.5 percent annual enrollment growth, but assumed that the combination of competitive pressures and need to divert financial resources to internal uses would compress cash flow margins by 50 percent after ten years.
In our third scenario, we continued the assumption of margin compression but assumed that cash flow margins would reach 4.16 percent within five, rather than ten years. In addition, we assumed enrollment growth would slow to one-half the 1981-84 rate after five years.
To evaluate these three scenarios, we examined a range of net present values based on discount rates ranging from 18 to 25 percent. 7 The results are presented in Exhibit 2. To permit easy comparison between our hypothetical scenarios and actual firms, we have converted all valuation data into a measure of value per current HMO enrollee. In Exhibit 3, we present comparable data on the present and past market values of the eight public HMO companies under study. In constructing Exhibit 3, we relied on company annual reports and 10-K filings with the Securities Exchange Commission to obtain 1981-84 peak price data. Current market price data were derived from the Wall Street Journal for trades reported during the week of December 2-6, 1985. Projections of enrollment levels in the fourth quarter of 1985 were drawn from both company and market research forecasts. Total capitalization values were derived by multiplying the appropriate market price data by the latest reported estimates of common shares outstanding.
If our choice of scenarios does in fact provide a reasonable spectrum of optimistic to conservative valuations of HMO cash flows, then it appears that the market is weighting many of these stocks well into the optimistic range. At least four stocks are valued well in excess of $500 per currently projected enrollee. At such prices, the market appears to believe that at least these specific companies can substantially outperform the 1981-84 for-profit HMO experience for some time to come. Given that the investors paying these prices for these stocks are all consenting adults, no purpose is served by quarreling with the market's perceptions. Rather, our purpose is to understand the implications of the market psychology for future developments in the financing of alternative health care delivery systems.
Boom Or Bust?
One logical consequence of the heavily future-oriented pricing structure of HMO stocks is the significant possibility of a wrenching market shakeout in the next few years.
This inference is drawn directly from the pricing logic implicit in the foregoing discussion. As noted, the market appears to believe that the value of an HMO, as a going concern, may well be in the range of $500 to $800 per current enrollee. If this is the case, total market capitalization of an HMO can be enhanced by expanding enrollment even if that expansion results in a temporary depression of operating results. Consider the example of HealthCare USA, formed in May 1985 by the merger of the HMO operations of Greatwest Hospitals (primarily General Medical Centers HMO in Southern California) and Independence Health Plan of Michigan. As a result of the merger, along with the attendant cost of Greatwest's disposal of its non-HMO operations, the consolidated earnings of the merged entity disappeared in its fiscal year ending September 30, 1985; it lost $0.07 per share on continuing operations and $0.87 on discontinued operations. On its unaudited balance sheet, as reflected in its Form 10-Q filing with the Securities Exchange Commission, current liabilities exceeded current assets by $7.5 million. Of the $125.8 million These facts notwithstanding, the market, as of the first week of December 1985, accorded HealthCare USA a total capitalization of $73.3 million, or $305 per estimated current enrollee. The implications of this sort of market confidence in great things in the far future may well have powerful effects on the present.
The internal incentives of present market dynamics can best be illustrated by a concrete example of how such a market pricing regime interacts with the nationwide trend toward HMO startups. To provide such an example, we draw on a recent feasibility study by ICF Incorporated of the startup of an alternative delivery system in a highly competitive market in the East. Based on an assessment of marketing prospects and plan cost structures, that study developed the following pro forma operating estimates for the plan start-up in question. (See Exhibit 4.) The foregoing projections assume that the plan is 100 percent equity financed, that is, that capital is available to cover the cumulative losses until the plan reaches cumulative break-even, with no borrowing. Let us suppose that a potential plan sponsor, evaluating whether to invest a cumulative $1.8 million to get such a plan off the ground, factors in the possibility that, once the break-even point has been reached, the plan might be sold at a price of $500 per current enrollee. Exhibit 5 summarizes the cash flows that would result from a simplified version of such a transaction at the end of year four of operations. The internal rate of return on this stream of cash flows, precapital gains taxes, is 68.2 percent. This is a somewhat better deal than U.S. Savings Bonds. Even after capital gains taxes, figured at the 22 percent maximum rate, the deal has an after-tax return of 53 percent.
Exhibit 4 Financial Estimates For An Alternative Delivery System
Nor does this illustration fully capture the profits lurking out there in Of course, these projections all assume that the plan can, in fact, be managed so as to produce an operating break-even at 13,000 enrollees in year four. Nowhere is it written that this happy result will be obtained. For one thing, the supply of talented HMO managers who can successfully bring off these complex startups is not infinite. On the other hand, the market discount for plans that are losing money is not all that severe; refiguring the leveraged deal with a sell-out price of $305 per enrollee (the market's current valuation of HealthCare USA) depresses the rate of return only to 63 percent. From any perspective, therefore, if present prices hold, the business of building HMOs to sell them down the road to eager investors can be a spectacularly profitable one.
It is a basic tenet of microeconomic theory that such a situation cannot long exist, since the rate of return implied by transactions of this sort is well in excess of the equilibrium rate of return available generally in the marketplace. 8 One would expect two subsequent developments in a market configured in this fashion. First, one would expect every venture capitalist with $200,000 to burn to rush into the market to cash in on the expected windfalls. For if building one HMO and selling out at these prices is a good' idea, building ten HMOs and taking them public for $150,000,000 within three years looks like a great idea. As recounted in the beginning of this article, there is some evidence that this phenomenon is already manifest. At some point, however, the proliferation of plans will oversaturate the marketplace, with the result that margins will be competitively compressed and prices for plans will start to fall.
Both of these factors are important in evaluating the future trend in HMO development because the high rates of return described above are totally dependent on the sales price. In the example under discussion, if we assume no sale and make a pro forma extension of year five enrollment growth rates and margins-not an excessively conservative assumptionthe plan under study would show an internal rate of return of 24 percent over the first ten years. While such a return is still a very good investment, it is not so good an investment as to justify some of the higher prices presently being paid for HMO stocks; at an 18 percent discount rate, the net present value of the cash flows associated with this scenario evaluate to $348 per enrollee in year one.
Is The High Growth/ High Margin Scenario Sustainable?
In all, then, the central question in evaluating the market for equity in HMOs is whether the assumptions underlying the current pricing structure are sustainable-whether the industry as a whole, and individual firms within that industry, can continue to enjoy rapid enrollment growth and high margins into the distant future. In rendering a judgment on this question, a number of factors are relevant.
First, as suggested above, there is the potential for an inherent contradiction between current prices and expected future prices. If current price structure affords entrepreneurs the possibility of 50-100 percent annual returns through sales of start-up plans, capital will continue to pour into the HMO development business. This will tend to hasten the maturation of the industry, increasing competition among plans substantially. As the maturation point is reached, one would expect increasing difficulty in the competition for additional enrollees, price cutting, and the compression of operating margins. If this scenario does unfold, then future results will not support current valuations.
We observe that if the HMO industry continues to grow at 1981-84 rates (17.5 percent) between now and the end of the century, the market penetration rate would perforce reach 71.5 percent by the year 2000. Even the most ardent HMO proponents would be cautious in adopting such an assumption.
Of course, as in all things, there will be winners and losers. Even if a 17.5 percent annual growth rate is unsustainable for the industry as a whole, individual firms can surely outperform the industry (while, of course, others underperform the industry). On balance, however, it's difficult to elude the impression that the HMO market might be poised for a galvanic shakeout a few years down the road.
Evidence from current operating statistics. Further evidence of this possibility lies in an evaluation of current operating statistics for HMOs nationwide. Present data bases on HMO financial results carry some severe deficiencies in analyzing the financial performance of HMOs. The Office of Health Maintenance Organizations (OHMO) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services maintains substantial information on federally qualified HMOs, but maintains no comprehensive data set on nonqualified plans. Publicly available OHMO data does contain financial data for federally qualified plans on a disaggregated basis, but balance sheet data, and decompositions of revenue and earnings data are not generally available for nonqualified HMOs. 9 While InterStudy maintains data on both qualified and nonqualified plans, financial data are lacking.10 While the rapid growth of existing plans and the proliferation of new ones would make the task of building and maintaining an adequate research data base difficult, our work in this area leads us to the conclusion that establishment of such data bases is a necessary prerequisite to meaningful research.
For purposes of our current inquiries, we investigated a number of hypotheses using publicly available data from the OHMO data base. Hence, the tentative conclusions we draw about HMO operating results are applicable only to the universe of federally qualified plans. Given the strong pressure on for-profit operators to seek federal qualification for marketing purposes, however,. this restricted data set may have some relevance to the matter at hand.
Operating margins of qualified HMOs. Our purpose was to investigate the extent to which the operating results of HMOs in recent years confirmed, or rebutted, the presumption of endless prosperity apparently built into market valuations of publicly traded plans. Given the limitations of the data base, it was not possible to construct cash flow data for all plans. At present, investigations of this sort are, of necessity, limited to evaluations of reported earnings data (defined as the difference between reported "income" and expenses). Even these data, however, are highly suggestive. (See Exhibit 7.) As the data indicate, while the 1982-84 period is perceived as a period of substantial growth and profitability in the industry, eighty-six, or 40 percent of all plans, experienced a cumulative loss over the 1982-84 period. Of the 131 plans reporting cumulative profits over the period, seventy-seven, or 59 percent reported cumulative profit margins of 0-5 percent. Only fifty-four plans, together comprising 22 percent of total enrollments, had profit margins in excess of 5 percent.
One might hypothesize that the relatively low operating margins of the 
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One hypothesis for further study is whether the profits reported by the publicly owned companies are due, in some respect, to their growth from buying out winners. If this hypothesis were supportable, it would be testimony to the business acumen of the enterpreneurs who operate these companies, and carry positive implications for the companies' futures. On the darker side, however, the above data suggest that the supply of winners for further acquisitions may become limited at some point. If this were to be the case, it would carry negative implications for the ability to maintain or increase profitability exclusively through acquisition in the future.
A second hypothesis worthy of further consideration is that the HMO business may have inherent characteristics that incline it toward lowmargin, high-volume operations. Such structural characteristics might include scale economies or diseconomies across different ranges of enrollment sizes, patterns of price discrimination, product differentiation, or other pecularities of industrial organization. 11 This possibility is suggested by study of the operating data of such large mature HMOs as the Northern and Southern California regions of Kaiser Permanente, where average margins long have held in the 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent range. 12 If this hypothesis were confirmed, it would have substantial implications for the potential for equity capitalization of HMOs over time, since a key determiner of market capitalization of HMO companies will be the return on equity available. for HMOs compared to alternative investments. Exhibit 8 illustrates the profound effect that operating margins have on market capitalization holding revenues constant. In this exhibit, we construct the hypothetical market capitalizations that would be obtained in a perfect market if revenues and margins were assumed to be indefinitely constant, and a target rate of return on equity of 15 percent was specified. For purposes of illustration, we have fixed revenues at $957.9 million, the level of revenues in calendar year 1984 of the eight HMO operating companies studied earlier.
As Exhibit 8 illustrates, with revenues and target rate of return held constant, market capitalizations are directly proportional to profit margins. Given that the actual market capitalization afforded to the eight firms under study is presently $1.3 billion, it is clear that the market does not expect either stagnant revenues or falling margins. If the hypothesis of low profit margins at long-run equilibrium is correct, however, it will place an effective lid on the ability of the industry to attract private equity capital.
Conclusions
In this article, we did not set out to conduct a rigorous analysis of HMO finances, or to reach definitive conclusions about the "just price" of HMOs. Rather, our intent was to illustrate what we believe to be a number of important issues regarding the financial underpinnings of the HMO industry at the present time, and to speculate on the possible implications of these issues for the financing of HMOs in the future.
Nor was our purpose to run down HMO stocks; as noted before, we believe that the markets will go where they will, and that, in any event, investors undoubtedly have their own reasons for purchasing securities at prices that make sense to them based on their own perceptions of underlying values. It is highly likely that many of these companies will be winners, justifying the faith placed in them and their managements by visionary investors.
It seems reasonable to conclude, however, based on our ruminations to date, that at least some will not. Moreover, we believe that the prices presently prevailing in the HMO equity market could provide a powerful spur to a "boom and bust" cycle of overbuilding and subsequent retrenchment in the HMO field. In industry after industry-from the oil service business to the personal computer business-this same story has played out time and time again.
If this prediction is correct, what does this imply for the future of HMO development? The timing of any substantial market revaluation of HMO equity will be important in assessing probable effects. The later the market recalibration, the greater the possibility of substantial overbuilding of HMOs in many markets. With an earlier revaluation, however, the danger of overbuilding in established markets will diminish, along with the slowdown of new market infiltration. It is interesting to speculate on what the timing of the shakeout implies for the relationship of falling market capitalization and falling plan prices. The importance of one of these factors could take precedence over the other, depending on the degree of market saturation. While it would be foolhardy to predict the winners or losers in the outcome, it would appear that an effect difficult to avoid will be the eventual concentration of the industry into a smaller group of larger companies. Whether this will be accomplished by mergers and acquisitions among plans or by acquisitions by larger insurers and hospital chains is impossible to say; the odds are that some combina-HMOS AND FINANCE 65 tion of these events will occur.
The lesson we draw from this analysis is that decisionmakers in the health care field should base their thinking on fundamental long-term prospects, rather than getting mesmerized with the possibility of nearand intermediate-term gains. Those starting plans today with visions of selling out tomorrow at phenomenal gains may get rich; alternatively, they may get clobbered if private investors, disillusioned by a market shakeout, flee the industry in favor of next year's darling. For in the end, the HMO business will be a good business only to the extent that it adds up to the right judgment about how a significant segment of the health care system should be economically organized. If an HMO is the right answer in a particular market area, it will prosper on its merits. But if the numbers add up only by virtue of extravagant assumptions of HMO sales prices, success may prove fleeting indeed.
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